It is often thought that Aristotle restricts the scope of justice to existing communities. Against prominent treatments of this problem, this paper argues that while Aristotle does indeed restrict the scope of justice, he recognizes eudaimonic reasons to cultivate co-operative and benevolent relations and to eschew manipulative and exploitative ones. His limitation of justice to existing communities thereby avoids the unsavory implications often attributed to it.
some relation of mutual benefit. 1 My goal in this paper is to show that while Aristotle holds that justice depends on community, his view does not have the unsavory implications often attributed to it.
To do this, I consider two alternative attempts to address this issue, one by extending the bounds of community to encompass all human beings, and another by appealing to virtues other than justice to transcend the limitations of community. Against the first, I argue that Aristotle does not maintain that we have actual obligations of justice to every human being. Against the second, I argue that, on Aristotle's view, none of our actual relations to other human beings falls outside the scope of justice, and although we have obligations of justice only to those with whom we are already in community, we have what I will call eudaimonic reasons to seek justice and avoid injustice in all of our relations with others. I conclude by suggesting that Aristotle's approach fares better in comparison to fundamentally impartial or rights-based theories of justice than we might initially suppose. First, however, I begin by setting out the evidence that Aristotle regards justice as dependent on community.
-IAristotle associates justice and community closely throughout the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics as well as the Politics. For our purposes, the most salient feature of the view that emerges from these texts is this: there is an internal conceptual connection between justice and community because correct standards of justice are essentially those which enable the members of a community to achieve the common good for the sake of which they participate in that community. As Aristotle sees it, "every community is established for the sake of some good, since everyone does everything for the sake of what they think to be good" (Pol. 1.1 1252a2-3).
Justice is whatever promotes and preserves that common good (Pol. 3.12 1282b17, EN 5.1 1129b25-27). So there is no sense to be given to the notion of justice outside of community. Though this view has several distinctive theoretical strengths that we should appreciate before going on to consider its possible limitations, I will first try to 1 All translations are my own. I follow the Oxford Classical Text editions throughout.
show that it is in fact Aristotle's view. 2 The clearest expressions of the thought that justice depends on community appear in the discussions of friendship in the Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics:
It seems, as was said in the beginning, that friendship and justice concern the same things and exist among the same people. For in every community there is a kind of justice and a kind of friendship as well. People use the term "friends," at any rate, to address their fellow travelers and their fellow soldiers, and likewise those in the other communities as well. And to the very same extent that they share something in common, there is friendship, because there is also justice (EN 8.9 1159b25-32) .
To inquire how one should relate to a friend is to inquire about a sort of justice. For in fact, quite generally all justice is in relation to a friend, since justice exists among particular people who share something in common, and a friend is a person who shares something in common (EE 7.10 1242a19-22) .
In both of these passages, the connection between justice and friendship is explained by the connection of each to community. The Eudemian passage asserts that "justice exists among particular people who share things in common," and that since people who share things in common are friends, justice exists among friends.
The Nicomachean passage makes the same argument: justice and friendship occur together because both depend on and are entailed by relations of community. It adds that justice and friendship co-vary in degree with community, so that the more people share, the more extensive the obligations of justice between them.
3 This variation in the obligations of justice suggests that justice not only presupposes a context of community, but is given its diverse shapes by the different ways in which goods are shared.
This connection between justice and community is also prominent in the treatment of justice in Nicomachean Ethics 5. 4 Aristotle here distinguishes between a broad or general and a narrow or particular kind of justice (EN 5.1 1129a26-b1) . 5 In its narrow sense, justice is equality or fairness in distributions and exchanges (EN 5.2 1130b30-1131a9). In its broader sense, justice encompasses the other-regarding aspects of all the virtues, not the least of which is justice in its narrow sense (EN 5.1 1129b25-27) . Aristotle somewhat confusingly identifies justice in its broad sense with "lawfulness," where this seems to mean not obedience to whatever laws happen to be established, but a willingness to promote the common good that he regards as the constitutive aim of laws: "the laws speak about everything, aiming either at the common advantage for all or for the best or for those in authority or in some other such fashion, so that in one way we call just those things that produce and protect happiness and its parts for the political community" (EN 5.1 1129b14-19) . 6 Each of the virtues, insofar as its exercise involves acting in relation to others, takes this common good into consideration and seeks to promote or at least to preserve it.
Equality, the special domain of justice in its narrower sense, is therefore only one part of justice, but nonetheless an important part: "for everything unequal is unlawful, but the unlawful is not all unequal" (EN 5.2 1130b12-13). So we should not seek to understand all of justice in terms of equality, but we should seek to understand equality in terms of the common good.
Aristotle gives pride of place to the political community in his account of justice not because he thinks that justice exists only in political communities, but
because he regards what he calls "political justice" as the paradigm and central case of justice by reference to which we should understand its other varieties (EN 5.6 1134a24-30). 7 The political community can play this role because it aims at the good life for all of its members. The city's goal is therefore the most authoritative and inclusive goal possible, and since other communities aim in some way at the means to or parts of happiness for their members, each is a sort of part of the political community (EN 8.9 1160a8-30; cf. Apeiron 48.2 (2015), 195-219. 8 Compare the relationship between the varieties of friendship in EN 8, which are also related by resemblance to the paradigmatic variety; advantage friendships can exist even where friendships of character do not. On the "resemblance" relation more generally, see Zingano, "The Conceptual Unity."
reason readily suggests an explanation.
Recall that "every community is established for the sake of some good, since everyone does everything for the sake of what they think to be good" (Pol. 1.1 1252a2-3). This claim is an application of the principle that opens the Nicomachean Ethics: "every craft and every inquiry, and likewise every action and decision, seems to seek some good" (EN 1.1 1094a1-2). 9 Individuals participate in communities in order to achieve some good for themselves. 10 Hence in every sort of community, the members have reason to seek to benefit from their participation at least in proportion to contributions they make. But the goods that we achieve in community depend on the co-operation of others. Hence each member has reason to value the contributions of others, since each member stands to benefit from those contributions. Yet each of those others also participates in order to achieve some good for themselves, and if they do not benefit at least in proportion to their contributions, then they will have less reason to co-operate or no reason at all. Hence each member has reason to seek proportionately equal benefits for those others, as well, since benefiting from participation is what gives each of those others sufficient reason to contribute.
Equality is an aspect of the common good because it ensures that we all benefit from co-operation and that we all benefit those who benefit us.
9 Hence Aristotle subscribes to some version of the so-called "Guise of the Good" thesis, which holds that intentional (or perhaps, more narrowly, rational) action always aims at the good. , 52-5, among others) that he maintains that an individual rational agent's deliberation and choice should be regulated by the fundamental goal of achieving his own eudaimonia, and hence that concern for the good of others is justified if and only if it contributes to the agent's own eudaimonia. It should be emphasized, however, that this sort of eudaimonism does not reduce concern for others to a concern for oneself; both the good of others and one's benevolent concern for them may be partially constitutive of one's own good (for a defense of this point, see David O. Brink, "Eudaimonism, Love and Friendship, and Political Community," Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (1999), 252-89 Paulo, v.10, n.1. p. 59-91, 2016 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 Of course, Aristotle does not quite put it like that, and interpreting what he says about equality and the common good in this way could be misleading if it seems to suggest that people have only instrumental reasons to co-operate. Aristotle's conception of community and friendship is famously a much richer one that gives prominence to forms of co-operation in which the goods that people seek are internal to their shared activities and include the good of their fellow participants. 11 But even where the good of one friend is least easily distinguished from the good of another, it remains clear that each of the participants benefits, and an arrangement in which one member benefited disproportionately at the uncompensated expense of another would be unjust.
Aristotle applies this conception of justice throughout the Politics, where a necessary condition of just rule over any free person is that the ruler aim at the good of the ruled or at a good common to both of them:
Although in truth the same thing is beneficial for the natural slave and the natural master, nonetheless despotism rules with a view to the benefit of the master, and only incidentally with a view to the benefit of the slave...but the rule of children and a wife and the whole household, which we call household management, is either for the sake of the ruled or for the same of something common to both. In itself it is for the sake of the ruled, as we see in the case of the other arts, such as medicine and physical training. But it could incidentally be for the sake of [the rulers] themselves... So too in politics... it is apparent that the constitutions that aim at the common benefit turn out to be correct so far as what is just without qualification is concerned, and those that aim at the good of the rulers alone are all mistaken and deviations from the correct constitutions; for they are despotic, but the city is a community of free people (Pol. 3.6 1278b32-79a2, 17-21) .
To rule another person is, among other things, to decide what that person will do and abstain from doing. Slavery, as Aristotle understands it, is a relationship in which the master rules his slaves entirely for his own sake, treating them as instruments of his own action rather than independent practical agents with interests separate from his own (Pol. 1.4 1254a8-11-17, 1.6 1255b9-15, EE 7.9 1241b20-23, EN 8.11 1161a32-b3). Unjust distributions and exercises of political power are "despotic" because they structure the relationship of ruler and ruled in a similar way, subordinating the interests of the ruled to those of their rulers. All of the so-called "correct" constitutions distribute political office in accordance with the aristocratic principle that equals deserve equals and unequals unequals, where equality is assessed in terms of ability to contribute to the common good through the exercise of that office (Pol. 3.9 1280a25-81a10. cf. NE 5.3 1131a25-29). 12 To distribute equally without regard to ability or unequally on the basis of some other criterion would yield a disproportion of benefits and burdens, leaving the burdened parties to serve the interests of their superiors without benefiting in proportion to their contribution. This subjection of one party's interests to another's tends to lead to civil strife (stasis), undermining the stability of the city and thereby depriving the rulers and the unruly ruled alike of the conditions favorable to the pursuit and achievement of their own well-being (Pol. 5.2-3 1302a16-b33). Proportionate equality of benefits to burdens and contributions stabilizes the city by giving all parties reason to co-operate and benefit one another (Pol. 5.8 1307b26-8a13).
This approach to justice has at least three closely related strengths. First, linking justice so closely to mutual benefit guarantees that justice will have some connection to people's reasons for action, but not so close a connection that it would be incoherent to ask whether specific agents in specific situations have decisive reason to act justly. It thus helps us to understand why justice is so important in human affairs and yet such a source of both interpersonal and intrapersonal conflict.
Second, linking justice so closely to mutual benefit and to people's reasons for action helps to specify the content of justice in different contexts. and accounts for the variety of our obligations to others.
-IIFor all that, the gains of understanding justice in this way seem to come at a great cost. The basic problem is simple: if obligations of justice are generated by shared interests in the mutual benefit to be had from co-operation, then we have no obligations of justice to anyone with whom we are not engaged in some form of mutually beneficial co-operation. We are not only free to ignore those outside our communities, but it seems that we have no reason to restrain our behavior towards 14 To be more precise, it constrains and guides that judgment in conjunction with a substantive account of the specific common good at which the members of a specific kind of community aim. Curzer, Aristotle and the Virtues, 277-84 illustrates this point with helpful examples. 15 Fundamentally impartial theories of justice can do this too by emphasizing that we are in a better position to benefit those with whom we stand in close relations than those with whom we do not. Such theories, however, seem to make the justification of special concern implausibly derivative; Aristotle's account justifies such concern more directly and is to that extent more intuitively plausible. Paulo, v.10, n.1. p. 59-91, 2016 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 them, unless of course it turns out to be in our interest.
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It is not wholly implausible that Aristotle might have held a so-called "realist"
view of inter-political relations, on which justice is wholly subordinated to or even eliminated in favor of self-interest in the relations between political communities. But at just the point where we would expect to find that view clearly expressed, we get what appears to be an unequivocal affirmation that justice extends to relations between communities. In criticizing the view that the aim of political life is to exercise power over one's neighbors, Aristotle responds:
And yet it would perhaps seem too weird to those who are willing to consider the matter if the statesman's task is to be able to contemplate how he might rule over and dominate his neighbors, whether they are willing or unwilling. How, after all, could what is not even lawful be characteristic of a statesman or a lawgiver? To rule not only justly but unjustly is not lawful, and it is possible to exercise power in a way that is not just…and it would be strange if there is not something that by nature is fit to be ruled despotically and something that is not fit to be ruled despotically, and so, if this is how it is, one should not try to rule over everyone despotically, but over those fit to be ruled in that way...but the many seem to think that despotic rule is politics, and they are not ashamed at practicing toward others the very thing they claim is neither just nor advantageous for themselves. For in their own case they seek just rule, but toward others they care nothing for just things (Pol. 7.2 1324b22-28, 32-36).
Aristotle plainly thinks that the many are mistaken. Later on in Book 7, he
writes that "military training should not be taken up in order to enslave those who do not deserve it, but, first of all, in order not to be enslaved to others; second, in order to seek leadership for the benefit of those who are ruled, but not for the sake of despotism over all; and third, to rule as masters over those who deserve to be slaves" (Pol. 7.14 1333b38-34a2). Though our attention is apt to fall on Aristotle's endorsement of slavery and imperialism, for our purposes the more important point is his insistence that superior force or power are never sufficient to justify ruling others.
In these passages, then, Aristotle maintains that dominating others who do not deserve it is unjust even when those others are not members of our own political community. When he says that ruling unjustly is not lawful, he cannot mean that it is not legal or customary, for there are no established legal rules between political communities who are not members of an alliance or federation, and in any case the custom in Aristotle's time was for victors in war to enslave at least some of the people they conquered. 17 The generality of Aristotle's claims shows that they are not concerned solely with relations between cities that have already formed some kind of alliance. If our city were to embark on an expedition to conquer some distant and heretofore unknown group of people, our ambitions of conquest would be unjust unless those people happened to deserve to be enslaved, and while Aristotle, to put it lightly, overestimates the number of people who meet that description, meeting it has nothing to do with how far away one lives from one's potential conquerors. 18 So these passages imply that justice extends beyond any of our existing communities. arguing that "all justice is in relation to a friend," the Eudemian Ethics tells us that there would be justice of a sort even if there were no polis, since "a human being is an animal that is capable of sharing things in common with those to whom he is by nature akin" (EE 7.10 1242a25-26). More explicitly, the Nicomachean Ethics claims that there can be no friendship in relation to a slave "in so far as he is a slave, since there is nothing common...so in so far as he is a slave, there is no friendship toward him, but in so far as he is a human being, there is, for there seems to be something just for every human being in relation to everyone who is able to share in law and agreement. There is friendship, too, then, to the extent that he is a human being" (EN Miller, Nature, Justice, and Rights, 86. 21 The radically incapacitated are the so-called "slaves by nature"; the undeveloped are young children. Aristotle recognizes certain ways in which members of either class should and should not be treated, but he is unwilling to regard this as a kind of justice strictly speaking because the interests of natural slaves and undeveloped children are not sufficiently separate from those of their masters or parents; natural slaves and children are both in effect "parts" of their masters or parents (EN 5.6 1134b8-16 Compare promises. Suppose that if I make a promise to you, I thereby acquire an obligation to do whatever I have promised. From the possibility that I might acquire an obligation, it does not follow that I have that obligation. Nor does the possibility of acquiring an obligation give me any reason to make the promise that would generate it. On the contrary, it often gives me reason not to make that promise. So the mere possibility of community with all human beings does not resolve our problem: for all that possibility shows, we are still free to disregard the effects of our actions on those with whom it does not seem to be in our interest to co-operate.
A second approach to this problem has recently been elaborated by Howard
Curzer. For Curzer's Aristotle, the possibility of community with others is important, but insufficient for justice: "we must be open to the possibility of having justiceduties toward anyone. But Aristotle does not think that we actually already have justice-duties to people who are outside of our friendships. We may try out our new swords upon non-friends without acting unjustly." 22 Curzer does not think that Aristotle's view on this matter is inconsistent; when he denounces militaristic foreign policy, Aristotle is claiming "only that if a country conquers its neighbors and rules them despotically, it will be sucking them into an uncaring and unjust civic friendship." 23 So ruling one's neighbors despotically will indeed involve injustice, but only because it will establish a community in which some people's interests are subjected to those of others.
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As Curzer sees it, this qualification does not go very far toward remedying the defects of Aristotle's theory: we can try out our new swords on strangers without treating them unjustly because being on the receiving end of a samurai slice does not 22 Curzer, Aristotle and the Virtues, 287, alluding to the samurai custom of "trying out one's new sword on a chance wayfarer" discussed in Mary Midgley's often anthologized "Trying Out One's New Sword," originally published in Mary Midgley, Heart and Mind (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1981) . 23 Curzer, Aristotle and the Virtues, 286. 24 Morrison, "Aristotle's Definition of Citizenship," 155 takes much the same view. 31 Curzer, Aristotle and the Virtues, 252 denies that economic exchange qualifies as friendship on Aristotle's view, and hence implies that it does not amount to a form of community either. He attempts to explain away the passages from Nicomachean Ethics V on the grounds that the parties to an exchange are fellow citizens and hence members of a "civic friendship," but Aristotle explicitly denies that commodity exchange occurs only within cities: at Pol. 3.9 1280b17-23, he famously describes a community of "exchange and alliance" that he insists would "not yet be a city," and he recognizes that many human beings live in non-political societies (this is one aspect of his distinction between polis and ethnos, e.g., Pol. 1.2 1252b19-20, 1.9 1257a23-5, 2.2 1261a27-9, 3.4 1276a27-9, 5.10 1310b35, 7.2 1324b9-12). 32 Curzer's principal argument against seeing exchange relations as communities or friendships is that the parties do not pursue a common goal. But the common goal they seek is a mutually beneficial exchange. I defend the genuinely communal status of exchange So the first point is that the scope of community extends just as far as cooperative interaction does, and since standards of justice apply to every community, justice extends as far as co-operative interaction. But exchange communities can help us to appreciate a second crucial point, as well. The justice or injustice of an exchange is wholly a matter of whether the goods that the parties exchange are of a proportionately equal value. It makes no difference whether the parties previously stood in some relation of mutual benefit or whether each of the parties might benefit more from cheating the other than from offering a fair return. The justice or injustice is a feature of the exchange, and asking whether the exchange is just differs from asking whether it is one that either of the parties has decisive reason to pursue.
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The same is true of other varieties of justice in other kinds of community.
Considered on its own, Aristotle's conception of justice as equality and the common good is consistent with a theory of rationality on which we regularly have reasons to be unjust. The proponent of such a theory need not deny that certain actions are just simply by virtue of denying that some range of agents has decisive reason to take those actions. 34 So too, even if Aristotle thinks that a person has obligations of justice only toward others with whom he has already entered into some co-operative endeavor, any interaction between separate human beings will be unjust if one of them benefits disproportionately at the expense of the other. In other words, justice is possible wherever people can co-operate together for the sake of a common good; but injustice is actual whenever people interact contrary to their mutual benefit.
Aristotle's theory therefore faces no obstacles to describing exploitative economic practices or the initiation of military force as unjust even when the parties are not antecedently members of some form of community. Nor is it simply, as Curzer relations at greater length in David J. Riesbeck, Aristotle on Political Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2016), ch. 2. 33 Hence I disagree with Kraut, Aristotle: Political Philosophy, 156, who writes that "the justice of requiring someone to make an equal return for a good he has received can only be recognized when one looks at the transaction from a larger perspective." Provided that the justice in question is the justice of making an equal return -rather than, as Kraut's formulation might suggest, the justice of a law requiring someone to make an equal returnthen Aristotle's analysis does not suggest this sort of limitation, and it would make an ill fit with his recognition of just and unjust exchange relations between people who are not fellow citizens (see note 31 above). 34 Compare the conception of justice elaborated by Glaucon in Republic II. On his view, perpetrators of injustice do not deny the injustice of their acts, they simply see no good reason to refrain from injustice when they can be reasonably assured of getting away with it. suggests, that these actions initiate unjust forms of community. We might, for instance, attack another city and kill all of its inhabitants in order to clear up space for a colony. There would be nobody left over to be subjected to an unjust form of "civic friendship," but Aristotle would pretty clearly regard this as unjust. If he regards the enslavement of naturally free people as unjust on the grounds that it harms them, he could hardly condone the slaughter of such people on the grounds that it does them no harm, and such a judgment would clash with his explicit limitations on acceptable reasons for going to war (Pol. 7.2 1325a5-10, EN 10.7 1177b5-12). Moreover, master and slave are not as such partners to any kind of friendship or community, let alone a civic or political friendship. A master treats his slaves as tools without any interests separate from his own; there is no common good between master and slave, because the slave's good is simply a function of the master's good. 35 Aristotle thinks that some slavery is just because he thinks that there are people who actually benefit from this sort of relationship. Naturally free people, however, are not benefited by it, but harmed, and their enslavement is unjust because their masters do not aim at their common good but instead subordinate their slaves' good to their own. Unjustly enslaved people are not being forced into contributing disproportionately to unjust political communities; they are instead being denied genuine membership in community altogether.
So Aristotle's theory does not imply that "we may try out our new swords upon non-friends without acting unjustly." The essence of injustice is the instrumental subordination of one person's good to that of another, and using other people to test out our weapons plainly meets that description. 36 For all that, it may yet be right to say that "we may treat non-friends without any concern for justice." Granted that some way of treating people outside our communities would be unjust, that may not constitute a reason not to treat them that way. Aristotle's theory of justice seems to make the reasons that we have to act justly toward others -what I have been calling obligations of justice -hang on the role that promoting and preserving some common good plays in promoting and preserving our own good. So even if acting toward 35 EN 8.11 1161a32-b3 denies that master and slave have a common good, while Pol. 1.6 1255b9-10 and 3.6 1278b33-4 insist that, in the case of natural slaves, "the same thing is beneficial" to both. On the consistency of these claims, see Lockwood, "Is Natural Slavery Beneficial?". 36 Aristotle would likely have denounced this sort of behavior even toward slaves, though not for reasons of strict justice (see note 21 above). Paulo, v.10, n.1. p. 59-91, 2016 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 others in ways that are not mutually beneficial is ipso facto unjust, we may nonetheless conceivably lack obligations of justice towards those who are not members of any of our communities, since there is no common good in which we and they share that gives us both reasons to seek justice in our relations with one another.
To adapt Curzer's example, we would act unjustly if we were to defraud some distant group of people of their valuable natural resources; but so long as we are not interacting with them, we have no obligations of justice to them -or, otherwise put, we have no reason to take their good into account when deliberating about what to do.
This limitation on the scope of the obligations or reasons of justice could be trivial or momentous, depending on how we understand its implications. For it might be taken to imply that we have no reason to take the good of distant peoples into account regardless of how our actions will affect them, and this would leave us free to treat them however we feel most convenient. Alternatively, it might be taken to imply simply that we have no reason to take their good into account provided that our actions will not unjustly harm them, and in this way would not amount to any significant limitation on the scope of justice. To avoid the momentous implication, however, Aristotle must recognize some reason why we should be just that does not appeal to a common good that we share with distant peoples. The lack of any such common good is what poses this problem in the first place, and the question we are trying to answer here is whether we have any reason to seek a common good with such people rather than to subordinate their interests to our own and to thereby treat them like slaves. It is, I think, just this sort of reason that Aristotle appeals to in his argument against domination as the goal of politics.
-IV - Aristotle argues for that conclusion when he turns to address what he regards as a flawed maximizing interpretation of the idea that ruling others politically rather than despotically is noble and therefore a suitable aim for the best way of life:
And yet since these things have been determined in this way, one might suppose that to be in control of everything is best, since in this way he would be in control of the most numerous and most noble actions, so that someone who is able to rule should not yield to his neighbor, but should deprive him of rule instead, nor should fathers take their children into account, nor children their fathers, nor in general should friend take account of friend or have any concern with regard to this. For the best is most choiceworthy, and acting well is best. Now perhaps they say this truly, if in fact the most choiceworthy of things that are will belong to those who rob and use force. But perhaps this cannot belong to them, and their supposition is false. For the actions can no longer be noble for one who does not differ so much as a man differs from a woman or a father from children or a master from slaves. And so the transgressor could not later correct such a great deviation from virtue; for [ruling] in turn is what is noble and just for those who are similar, since this is an equal and similar thing; but what is not equal for people who are equal and what is not similar for people who similar are contrary to nature, and nothing contrary to nature is noble (Pol. 7.3 1324a34-b10).
37 Translation of this term is vexed in part because no single English translation seems to produce the right connotations in every context; translators variously prefer "beautiful," "fine," and "noble." I discuss its meaning further below, but opt for the translation "noble" because it seems to me better than the alternatives at capturing the connotations of the term when applied to human action, which is my focus here; that is not to say that it is entirely satisfactory, much less that it captures the connotations of the term when applied outside the context of human action. Aristotle's opponents here concede that ruling over others despotically is not best because it requires no significant virtue and hence involves nothing noble. By contrast, they maintain that ruling others politically -ruling over free and equal people for their own benefit -is a noble thing. 38 But if ruling politically is noble, then it must, they think, be more noble to rule more and hence most noble to rule as much as possible. Crucially, this maximizing conclusion brings with it a clear-eyed acknowledgment that the maximizer achieves what is best for himself by depriving others of what would be best for them. It would therefore be insufficient for Aristotle to object that the maximizing strategy entails committing injustice. The maximizer does not pretend that it is fair or just for him to rule as much as possible, but only that it is best for him because it will enable him to perform the most noble actions. But
Aristotle does not object simply that it would be unjust to deprive one's equals of an equal share in ruling. Rather, he objects that this injustice undermines the nobility of ruling; if someone were to refuse to share rule with his equals, then his actions would not be noble.
Recall that the equality relevant to the distribution of political office is the equality of people's ability to contribute to the common good. Someone who deprives his equals of sharing in rule therefore not only robs them of whatever intrinsic benefit might be had from ruling, but prevents them from contributing to the common good.
Unless he is so superior to everyone else that he can promote the common good better by ruling alone than he can by sharing rule with others -in which case he would no longer be their equal, but would "differ so much as a man differs from a woman or a father from children or a master from slaves" -his maximizing strategy would be to the detriment of the community. That is sufficient to make his action unjust, but
Aristotle holds that it is also sufficient to deprive his actions of any nobility, and hence to undermine the value that ruling was supposed to have for the ruler himself.
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38 Pol. 7.3 1325a26-31 refers back to "the first discussions" for a fuller treatment of the distinction between despotic and political rule. This may be a reference back to 1.7 1255b16-20, 3.6 1278b30-1279a21, or both. 39 As I read this passage, Richard Kraut, Aristotle: Politics VII & VIII (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1997), 71-72 is mistaken to compare it to modern discussions of the problem of "dirty hands." Aristotle is not maintaining that "someone who wrongfully monopolizes a position of power" cannot later "use it for good ends." Rather, the maximizer may indeed use his power for good ends, but because his monopoly of power prevents others from making a collectively greater contribution to the common good, the good achieved through his actions is not sufficient to render his actions just or noble. It is not that he performs one bad action in order Paulo, v.10, n.1. p. 59-91, 2016 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 This notion of the noble or the kalon is at once central to Aristotle's practical thought and famously obscure. Though it appears to be an essential goal of virtuous action, neither the Ethics nor the Politics explains the concept, evidently relying instead on the audience's understanding of the term from its ordinary usage. 40 That usage combines connotations of beauty or attractiveness, functional excellence, and, at least in in human contexts, praiseworthiness. 41 Aristotle's discussions of the kalon elsewhere enable us to see how these connotations come together in a unified concept that has application to natural beings and artifacts but also to human action, where it takes on a distinctive shape.
The Metaphysics tells us that what is kalon possesses the properties of order (taxis), symmetry or proportion (summetria), and definiteness or boundedness (to hōrismenon, Met. 13.3 1078a36-b1). These properties, in turn, are to be understood teleologically: an entity exhibits order, proportion, and definiteness when its parts are arranged so as to contribute to the excellent functioning of the whole in achieving its ends. 42 This account of the kalon fits well with Aristotle's claims elsewhere about what makes animals (PA 1.5 645a21-6), cities (Pol. 7.14 1326a33), and artifacts (Poet. 7 1450b38-51a3) kalon. But it also seems to hold good for human action. 43 to perform some other good ones, but that so long as he prevents a fuller realization of the common good, he is committing injustice and not acting nobly. 40 For the kalon as the goal of virtuous action, see EN 3.7 1115b12-13.
The Topics claims that the kalon and the appropriate (to prepon) are the same, though the latter is "definitory" (horikon) of the former; this suggests that while the two concepts are co-extensive, something is kalon because it is appropriate (Top. 1.5 102a5-6).
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In the Nicomachean Ethics, appropriateness is closely associated both with the kalon and with the mean in action and feeling (EN 4.2 1122a34-b7, 1123a6-9, 4.6 1126b36-27a5, 10.8 1178a10-13). The virtuous agent feels and acts as he should, when he should, toward the people he should, as much and as long as he should, for the reasons he should, and so on; appropriate action just is action that hits the mean (EN 2.6 1106b21-28). 45 Yet hitting the mean also seems to be a matter of the order, proportion, and definiteness of the various dimensions of action with reference to its goal, presumably not only the proximate ends in view on any given occasion but also the overarching goal of living well. 46 But while an action's appropriateness and intermediacy may account for its functional excellence and perhaps for its beauty or attractiveness to an observer, it may yet seem possible for an agent to choose such an action without regarding it as especially attractive in its own right. Aristotle makes clear, however, that to choose an action as kalon is to choose it as something worthwhile and attractive in its own right. The Nicomachean Ethics repeatedly contrasts the kalon as an object of choice with the necessary and the useful, and even concern aesthetic beauty rather than nobility or moral beauty." But this response simply begs the question by supposing that the term has different meanings when it is applied to different contexts. Similarly, Kraut, "An Aesthetic Reading" maintains that the word also has a distinct, non-aesthetic sense in many passages. I take it for granted that a unified interpretation such as proposed by Rogers and Richardson Lear is preferable, and Irwin, Crisp, and Kraut do not seem to me to provide reasons to abandon it. 44 The explanatory priority of the appropriate is not entirely clear from the text of the Topics; Rogers, "Aristotle's Conception," 357, note 9 considers reasons to regard the appropriateness as "the more primitive notion," in contrast to Terence Irwin, "Aristotle's Conception of Morality," Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 1 (1985), 135, who claims that "the mean [and therefore the appropriate] is determined by reference to the fine." Though the Topics does not settle the question, the account of the kalon I give here is perhaps best understood as giving explanatory priority to appropriateness and teleological order; these properties make something kalon. 45 On the "doctrine of the mean," with the beneficial as such, suggesting that while everything kalon in action is choiceworthy for its own sake, not everything choiceworthy for its own sake is kalon (EN 2.3 1104b30-2, 2.8 1116b2-3, 4.1 1120b1, 4.3 1125a11-12, 8.1 1155a28-29, 9.2 1165a4, 9.7 1168a9-12, 9.8 1169a3-6, 9.11 1171a24-6) . 47 For an action to be kalon, then, is not simply for it to be teleologically well-ordered in an appropriate mean; it is also for it to be attractive in its own right to the agent who chooses it.
How can these features of kalon action help us to understand the virtuous person's attitude toward justice with people outside his existing communities?
Aristotle frequently associates kalon action with acting for the sake of others without any ulterior motive. This association is particularly strong in the Rhetoric, which gives prominence to actions such as "those choiceworthy things that someone does not for his own sake," "deeds for the sake of others," and "good actions that concern others and not oneself" (Rhet. 1.9 1366b36, 1367a3, 1367a4-5). The Nicomachean Ethics asserts a similarly tight connection between the kalon and the common good;
as we have seen, the virtue of justice in its broad sense encompasses the otherregarding aspects of all of the other virtues of character, and it is essential to virtuous action that the agent choose it for its own sake and not simply for the sake of its consequences (EN 5.1 1129b25-7, 2.4 1105a28-33). So kalon action, for Aristotle, is closely connected to acting for the sake of others, whether simply for their own sake or as part of the common good.
On some views, in fact, altruistic motivation is strictly essential to kalon action. 48 As others have noted, however, this is an unduly narrow view of the kalon that does not fit the texts. 49 Even the survey of popular beliefs in the Rhetoric, which provides the strongest evidence for the strictly altruistic interpretation, lists things such as honor, profitless possessions, and wearing one's hair long alongside acts of benevolence and the sacrifice of one's narrow self-interest as examples of the kalon (Rhet. 1.9 1367a23, 1367a27-8, 1367a28-32) . Most striking of all, the list includes "not practicing any vulgar craft, since it is proper to a free person not to live for another" (Rhet. 1.9 1367a32-3). To the extent that the Rhetoric's examples of the kalon form a consistent set, their unity seems to consist not in impartial benevolence as such but in a firm commitment to the priority of one's activity as a member of a community of free citizens over the value of external goods and bodily pleasures. It therefore seems appropriate to translate kalon as "noble" when it is applied to human action.
This understanding of the noble gains support from other aspects of Aristotle's appeals to it in the Nicomachean Ethics. He is clear from early on in the work that noble action is itself among the central components of eudaimonia, and hence something that is good for the agent (EN 1.8 1099a3-29, 1.10 1100b18-01a13, 1.12 1101b31-02a4). 50 Benevolence and acting for the sake of others are plainly a prominent feature of nobility, but Aristotle does not present them as stemming from a fundamentally impartial or altruistic motivation on the part of the virtuous agent. On the contrary, he stresses that a concern with noble action over the attainment of external goods and bodily pleasures is the dominant motivation of a praiseworthy and admirable sort of self-love (EN 9.8 1168b25-69b2 for himself. 51 He can take this attitude because, unlike the vulgar lover of self who rightly inspires the contempt of the many, he identifies himself not with his appetites but with his intellect (EN 9.8 1168b31-69a6). Noble action -not exclusively, but prominently including benevolent regard for others -is a good for the agent because it more fully expresses his nature as a rational agent and his proper commitment to rational activity as an end in itself rather than a mere instrument for the gratification of appetite.
If we wonder why activity that benefits others should be more expressive of rational agency than indifference or even malice, Aristotle suggests an answer in his discussion of why benefactors seem to love their beneficiaries more than vice versa:
just as craftsmen love their products because those products are an extension of their own productive activity and so, in a way, of themselves, so too beneficent action is an extension of the benevolent person's rational agency and so, in a way, of himself (EN 9.7 1167b31-68a12). 52 As he puts it in his treatment of liberality, benefiting others is better for the agent than being benefited because it is more active (EN 4.1 1120a9-13).
Manipulation and exploitation, by contrast, while not strictly passive, are standardly undertaken in the service of aims -wealth, luxury, pleasure -in relation to which the rational agent will in fact be passive. 53 Aristotle illustrates his claim about liberality with a general claim about virtue as such: "it belongs to virtue to benefit more than to be benefitted and to do fine things more than not to do shameful things" (EN 4.1 1120a11-13). Though Aristotle is in the first instance contrasting benefiting others with being the recipient of other people's beneficent action, there seems to be no reason not to extend the contrast to cover cases of acquiring pleasures or external goods through the manipulation or exploitation of others. On the rational passivity of bodily pleasures, see EN 1.5 1095b19-22, 3.10 1118b1-4; on wealth and pleasure, see Pol. 1.9 1257b40-58a14. On a view such as this, co-operative and benevolent relations with others have value for the agent that cannot be outweighed by the acquisition of external goods or the enjoyment of bodily pleasures. This conception of the agent's good has two important consequences. First, it means that the virtuous agent will simply lack the motivations responsible for much injustice; people do not generally manipulate and exploit the powerless out of a love for their own rational agency, but out of a love for wealth and the cheap and easy comforts of luxury. More importantly, however, Aristotle's virtuous person will see co-operative and benevolent action as crucial to who he is; he will therefore not only be averse to actions of a contrary sort, but will be attracted to justice in its own right. So while he will recognize no existing obligations of justice toward those with whom he is not already in community, he will not be indifferent to any potential injustice against such people. His own regard for himself and pursuit of his own well-being will give him reason to seek justice and avoid injustice in all of his endeavors.
It is this conception of the noble and its value for the agent to which we should see Aristotle appealing in Politics 7.3. To be sure, the argument there applies in the first instance to sharing rule with one's fellow citizens, and hence is concerned with justice inside the political community rather than with those who are outside it.
Nonetheless, the argument does not appeal primarily to the common good that will be served as a consequence of shared rule. It rests instead on the thought that a would-be ruler will achieve nobility in action, and hence his own good, precisely by promoting the common good through sharing rule with others. The maximizer deliberately prevents the fuller realization of the common good, and that is why his actions lack nobility. So while the nobility of action is contingent on its justice, it is the eudaimonic value of noble action, and not simply its promotion of the common good, to which Aristotle appeals in his argument against the maximizing interpretation of the value of political rule.
Justice toward those outside the political community should, however, be noble for just the same reasons as justice toward one's fellow citizens. After all, Aristotle maintains that the same way of life is best for a city as for an individual, and he disparages people who call for justice at home but show no regard for it abroad (Pol. 7.2 1324a5-13, b32-6, 7.3 1325b30-2). In light of the eudaimonic value of nobility in action, the limitation of actual obligations of justice to actual relations of community has trivial rather than momentous implications for the scope of justice. We do not owe anything to people with whom we stand in no relation of community, but we have decisive reasons to treat them justly when and if we encounter them or our actions impinge on their interests. Though Aristotle does not explicitly articulate this view, it is consistent his broader claims about virtue, nobility, and justice, and it helps to explain why he seems to take it for granted that a just city will not seek to dominate others. We should conclude, then, that Aristotle's theory of justice does not have the "hideous implication" that Curzer attributes to it, and that there is no need to appeal to some virtue other than justice to transcend its limitations.
-VOf course, Aristotle's view raises large and complex questions, and I have not attempted to defend it against objections. We might worry, as many have, that it makes other-regarding reasons too derivative and that we ought instead to recognize that the good of others makes a direct demand on our rational attention. This is a general objection to eudaimonism as I understand it, and though I think it can be answered, meeting it obviously goes beyond the scope of this paper. 54 We might also worry that an account like Aristotle's cannot make sense of the idea that justice involves duties of aid to people in need beyond our borders. 55 I am not sure how seriously we should take this objection in a globalized world in which some of our simplest actions -like buying lunch or purchasing clothes -impact people on the other side of the world with whom we can not sensibly regard ourselves as beyond 54 One strategy for meeting this objection might be to stress the "formal," as opposed to substantive, character of self-regard in eudaimonism, as Annas frequently has (Julia Annas, "Virtue Ethics and the Charge of Egoism," in Morality and Self-Interest, ed. Paul Bloomfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007), 205-21). Salmieri, "Aristotle on Selfishness" provides persuasive reasons to doubt that this strategy is satisfactory for the interpretation of Aristotle; Brink "Self-Love and Altruism," "Eudaimonism, Love and Friendship, and Political Community," and "Eudaimonism and Cosmopolitan Concern" defend eudaimonism's commitment to justifying concern for others by appeal to the agent's own good; Mark Lebar, Aristotle's can be vindicated. We need only look to Plato's Gorgias and Republic to appreciate the possibility of a certain sort of "immoralist" challenge: should we believe that rational activity is the central component of human well-being, and even if so, might not an agent committed to valuing it for its own sake above all else find that he can exercise it best precisely in manipulating and exploiting others? Aristotle does not directly address this sort of immoralist challenge, but the challenge is hardly special to Aristotle or eudaimonism more generally; it poses problems that any ethical theory must address.
57
In closing, I want simply to suggest that it is a strength of Aristotle's view that the eudaimonic value of justice renders any appeal to fundamental human rights or other, similarly impartial moral reasons unnecessary. One problem for conceptions of rights as morally fundamental is that it can seem mysterious how they are supposed to impose obligations on others who seemingly have no rational interest in the goods or autonomy to which rights-bearers purportedly have rights. 58 But if co-operative and benevolent relationships with others are a non-instrumentally valuable component or aspect of a good human life, then there is no need to appeal to rights in order to ground claims of justice; rights will be, at least theoretically if not rhetorically, reducible to claims about justice grounded in the value to human beings of cooperation on terms of equality. 59 I would not go so far as to claim that this is the only 56 So too the more general reflections of Brink, "Eudaimonism and Cosmopolitan Concern." 57 The problem for eudaimonism is not the difficulty of persuading an "immoralist" to act justly, but of showing that an adequate theory of human well-being must see just actions and dispositions as contributing to it and unjust actions and dispositions as detracting from it. Non-eudaimonist theories will not face quite this problem, and so may seem better placed to meet immoralist worries; but immoralism is likely to pose distinct challenges for such theories, and it is not at all apparent that they would fare better than eudaimonism in meeting them. For some thoughts on the shape of these problems, see Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001), ch. 7. 58 For a succinct treatment of this problem that is at least broadly consistent with the view I attribute to Aristotle, see Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1994), ch. 2. 59 I am indebted to Miller, Nature, Justice, and Rights for my thinking about the relation of justice and rights in Aristotle and more generally, but I draw a starkly opposed conclusion: where Miller sees Aristotle giving us a theory of rights, I see him giving us a theory of justice on which our concept of a right is reducible to the concept of justice as the promotion and
